

THE
CONSEQUENCES

OF

HIS MAJESTY'S Journey

TO

HANOVER;

At this Critical JUNCTURE.

Considered in a

LETTER

From a MEMBER of PARLIAMENT in Town,
to a NOBLE DUKE in the Country;

To which is added,

The Duke of A---le's SPEECH

Upon the STATE of the NATION:

With the REPLY to it, by Lord *****.

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THE HISTORY OF THE

BRITISH EMPIRE
BY LORD MACAULAY

LONDON:
Printed for C. Simpson, at Dawson's Place in the
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This Sixteenth Edition.



A

LETTER, &c.

My Lord Duke,

THE Letter Your Grace did me the Honour of, by the Conveyance of Mr. * * * *, was, according to Your Grace's Directions, deliver'd by himself into my own Hands, the twenty-eighth past; and the Obligation was enhanc'd, by the Manner of conferring it; I am not only indebted to Your Grace for the Favour of Your Commands, but for a Pleasure, I had almost despair'd of, that of seeing again my old Acquaintance, and very worthy Friend, who was charg'd with those Commands; to which, my Lord Duke, you will find, by this Return, that I have paid the most ready Obedience.

Your Grace has laid it upon me, however unequal to the Task, to justify, to the Satisfaction of the Publick, the unexpected Departure of His M---y to visit His *German* Dominions, at this extraordinary Juncture, when a War between *Great Britain* and *Spain*, and a War, which the wisest Men among us cannot yet tell how general it may become, seem'd strongly to plead for the animating Presence of Our Sovereign among Us.

To justify, *to the Satisfaction of the Publick*, is an arduous Undertaking indeed, and what, in the present Day, no Man alive perhaps is able to perform, was he to enter the Lists on Behalf of the best and wisest Measures that humane Actions are capable of being conducted by ; I shall therefore offer to go no farther, my Lord Duke, in Relation to this important Point, than to let Your Grace, who are now at a Distance from the Source of Intelligence, into what, according to the best Informations I can procure, were the Motives to ; and what, there is the highest Probability will be the Consequences of His M-----y's Journey into *Germany*, whilst, as Your Grace, expresses it, we have to deal with *Spaniards* Abroad, and Scarcity at Home ; and a long & *cætera* ; which, I must beg Leave, so far to differ from the Sentiments of You, my Noble Friend, as not to think worth troubling the Publick with.

If I am not impos'd upon, and if I am, 'tis by those from whom, we should not readily imagin'd Falshoods would flow ; I say, if I am not impos'd upon, the reasonable Expectations, the most promising Views of a National Good in particular ; and of securing certain Points of the utmost Importance to the Welfare of *Europe* in general, were the sole Inducements, to this so much wonder'd-at Step in the Father of his People, to leave them for a few Months, and take up his Residence Abroad ; and if this should appear to be the Case, Your Grace, I hope will pardon



don me, 'if I imagine I have sufficiently executed Your Orders, *of justifying to the Satisfaction of the Publick*; for I must certainly have done so then, to the full Satisfaction of every sensible Man in the Kingdom.

I should not have presum'd to have made use of the Word JUSTIFY upon this Occasion, had not Your Grace necessitated me to it, by fixing it upon me: The Sacred Person, here treated of, stands in no Need of any Justification of his Conduct, from a Subject; and it would be an unpardonable Presumption in me, to think He did: No, my Lord Duke, I am well assur'd, within my own Breast, that His M---y's Conduct will always justify itself; that His M---y never acts but by the wisest Measures, and to the best Views; and that it is the indispensable Duty of His People, to acquiesce, and patiently await the Issue of Proceedings; of which 'tis neither fit, or possible, they should be immediately let into the Secret Springs of, before they take upon them to form a Judgment in Relation to them: Would our People in general take this Advice, and make it the Measure of their own Behaviour, 'twould prevent much Uneasiness and Heart-burning among us, and save them from saying many Things which may do Mischief, but cannot possibly do any Good; and which they too often find Reason to be greatly ashamed of.

But to return to the present Duty Your Grace has made incumbent on me: You are pleas'd, my Lord Duke, to say, that the K--'s going to *Hanover* is disagreeable to the People; that they could not have believ'd His M---y would have left His *British* Dominions in a Time of War, and have left us to have shifted for ourselves, as 'tis call'd; or that any Thing would have carried him from Home, in a Time of Danger, unless it had come to a general War in *Europe*, and His M---y had hazarded his Person, in the Field, at the Head of His Army.

But

But 'tis only ignorant People, or worse, who talk at this Rate; we are not left to shift for ourselves, as they term it; we are left in wise and able Hands; His M---y is still at the Head of His Affairs, and still directs, animates and influences all the National Councils, as when present; but to let Your Grace at once, and in as concise a Manner as I am capable of, into the Reasons which have been given me for His M---y's Journey into *Germany* this Summer; I shall draw them up, as near as my Memory will enable me, in the very same Words, as I receiv'd them in myself; and I profess, before God and the World, they were entirely satisfactory to me; and that I cannot, for my Life, but think they must be so, to every honest Man in the Nation.

They assure me here, that immediately after the Rising of the Parliament, an Express arriv'd at St. *James's* with Assurances, which might be depended upon, and the Event since has sufficiently shewn that they might be so, that his *Prussian* Majesty was in such a declining State of Health that it was not morally possible, he could live Three Months; and to intreat His M---y's Presence at *Hanover*; that by His M---y's Personal Influence, the strict Amity, so much wanted and wish'd for by all Christendom, and so highly necessary for strengthening of the Protestant Interest, might be restor'd between the Courts of *Great Britain* and *Prussia*; and that as not any Thing seem'd to promise fairer for the immediate compleating so momentous an Affair, than His M---y's being upon the Spot, should the King of *Prussia's* Death happen, as was apprehended; we are told His M---y gave Way to the repeated Sollicitations made to him, on that Head, as not doubting the being able thereby to effect the great Design in View, and cement such a Friendship with the Young King, as should prove a lasting Advantage to the Liberties and Peace of *Europe*.

This

This is given us as one of the principal Reasons for His M---y's going Abroad ; and could no other be added, 'twould, I confess, be enough to weigh with me, as a sufficient Motive for doing so ; and as I take it, would still be of more Weight with all thinking Men, were we in ten times more Danger, than we seem to be at present, of a much more powerful Enemy to deal with, than *Spain* is ever likely to prove to us.

The Danger the late King of *Prussia* was in, was not plainly perceiv'd, we hear, till our Session of Parliament was over, or His M---y, 'tis said, would have acquainted the Houses, as usual, with his Intention ; but whether this might have been so or not, I have not the same Authority for, as for the rest ; nor can I say there ought to be equal Credit given to it ; for, in my humble Opinion, as we were in a State of War, as the Enemy's Ships were swarming in our Seas ; and as they had several strong Squadrons ready, or which might soon have been got ready to put to Sea upon any grand, or favourite Point with them, it was far from requisite, and would have been much farther from political, to have given an insulting Foe the Watch Word, by making so publick a Declaration of the Design so long beforehand ; merely to have paid a Compliment, which, in my humble Thoughts of the Matter, would not, at this Time, have answer'd one valuable Purpose ; and might have been attended, with unpleasant, if not dangerous Consequences, as far as it was within the Reach of a resentful Court to have render'd them dangerous.

But His M---y's Views were, we are assur'd, more extensive, than merely uniting the Interest of the Court of *Berlin*, and his Own ; and though the Certainty of the near Approach of the King of *Prussia*'s Demise might absolutely determine His M---y on a Point not before resolv'd on, as the only Means at once to perfect a Work of Consequence, not only to the

the present, but to the future Welfare of Christendom; His M---y was hereupon determin'd to embrace the favourable Opportunity to put the finishing Hand, if possible, to a Grand Alliance, which should be able to preserve the Ballance of Power in *Europe* from Danger, how strong soever may be the Efforts to destroy it, by those Powers, whose Inclination, or Interest, may put them upon making the Attempt.

Having so prevailing a Perswasive as an almost Moral Certainty, as I said before, of the Death of the King of *Prussia* being at Hand, it appears to us here, that the Expediency of a Tour to *Hanover* became unquestionable; so important an Accident must cause a considerable Change in the State of Affairs, and furnish Incidents, which a Prince who had the Good of His People at Heart, would enter upon the most probable Methods of improving to their Advantage; and what Method, say they here, could more probably be successful, than for His M---y to be able by his Presence, if necessary, to remove any unforeseen Obstacles which might arise to prevent the Settling upon such sure and lasting Foundations, the Friendship of Two Houses, already establish'd by the Ties of Blood, as that the great Expectations, from such a Friendship, should not fail coming up to the warmest Wishes of those, who were in the Interest of the Protestant Cause, to late Posterity.

Thus, my Lord Duke, You have from me the sole Motives, I can yet come at, which induc'd His M-y, at this Crisis, to leave *St. James's* for *Herenhausen*; and give me Leave to appeal to Your Grace, whether these are not abundantly sufficient to convince any reasonable Man, and every dutiful Subject in *Great Britain*, that it may be infinitely more to the Advantage, and for the Interest of *Europe* in general, that His Majesty went Abroad, considering the Critical Situation of the Grand Affair, than if he had staid at home: Not any Period of Time, since the Succession of the
August

August House of *Hanover* to the Throne, has, in my Judgment, furnish'd such cogent Arguments, as the present, for withdrawing the Sunshine of the Royal Presence from us; and 'tis not doubted here, but 'twill soon return, with an Encrease of Lustre.

With us 'tis look'd upon as a very fortunate, happy Incident, at this Juncture, that His M---y is in the Situation he has been pleas'd to place himself; I assure, Your Grace, we consider it as an additional Indication both of His M---y's Goodness and Penetration; as the Effect of deep Counsels, and well-concerted Measures; and that His M---y could not have given a stronger Testimony of His sincere Affection, for the general Welfare of *Europe*; or his having really at Heart the true Interest of His People in these Kingdoms, than by the Fatigue and Hazards His M-y has subjected himself to, upon this emergent Occasion.

I am not, my Lord Duke, intending a Panegyric, and shall therefore say no more of what has for some Time, been one Topick of Discourse, with the Judicious and Knowing Part of Mankind, with whom I constantly converse here; these, to a Man, express their Sentiments upon this Head, in a Manner which speaks the rais'd Expectations they entertain themselves with, from His M---y's becoming His Own Ambassador, as they call it, when Transactions of so nice a Nature, and of such vast Importance are to come upon the Tapis, and which require the most exquisite Discernment to discuss.

But to leave the Affair of *Prussia*: These Gentlemen seem to promise themselves besides, from His M---y's thus Placing himself in the Midst, as it were, of the Powers, (*which in Case of a General War in Europe, 'twould be absolutely necessary to unite in one Common Interest against the already too formidable House of Bourbon*) that His Majesty will be able so to unite them; and, upon honourable Terms, conclude such

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Treaties

Treaties with them, as shall deter the *French* from assisting the *Spaniards* in the present Quarrel; or if they should think fit to do it, shall afford such equal Assistance to *Great Britain*, as will entirely free our present Allies upon the Continent, as well as ourselves from any Apprehensions of what may be the Consequence of the most formidable Diversion they are able to make in their Favour; or that His Majesty will be able to conclude a Peace with *Spain*, to the full Satisfaction of the *English* Nation; whereby his injur'd Subjects shall not only have an adequate Reparation made them for Injuries past, but as full Security against all future Infringements of their Rights; and Depredations upon their Persons and Trade, as the Nature of Treaties between Sovereign Princes can possibly admit of.

To endeavour perhaps or effect an Accommodation of the Difference, between the Claimants upon *Juliers* and *Bergues*, after the Decease of the Elector *Palatine*, is expected will be another of the happy Consequences, attending his M---y's Residence in *Germany* this Summer: And was this to be the only Fruit of His Labours; the only Produce of the Royal Progress, 'twould be highly worthy of the K--g of *Britain*, and fully justify His M---y in leaving His *British* Dominions, at this Crisis, though even only in Hopes of amicably adjusting those Pretensions, of the contending Parties, which if left to the Decision of the Sword, would bid fair for bringing on a general War in Christendom.

By the Situation His M---y is in, we may be enabled, *and very justly too*, to draw our Eyes from a Neighbouring Monarch, and fix them on our Sovereign, as the GREAT ARBITER of the Fate of *Europe*: We may there consider him, settling the Peace of the *North*, and setting Bounds to the Ambition of *France*, by uniting in one Common Interest, *Great Britain*, *Holland*, *Prussia*; the Emperor of *Germany*; *Russia* and

and *Denmark*; and in a Word forming so grand an Alliance in Favour of the Protestant Cause, of the Peace, and of the Liberties of *Europe*; as will not only damp all the Hopes of Succour, the *Spaniards* may have flatter'd themselves with, in the unjust War they maintain with us; but deter those, who might have been willing to have assisted them, from coming to their Aid; and as far as humane Foresight is able to discover, preserve the Ballance of Power, and secure lasting Tranquillity in *Europe*.

As the Endeavours to bring all these great Points to bear, and to be in the Place the most probable, that such Endeavours should be attended with Success, equal to the present Exigency of Affairs, were the prevailing Motives with His M---y to commit, for a Time, the Reins of Government to the Hands of a Regency, and take up his Abode Abroad, I refer it to Your Grace, (whether they are crown'd with the much desired Reward or not; as no human Wisdom can guard against all future Contingencies) whether His M---y's Conduct does not only stand fully justify'd in the Eyes of all the World; but whether his own Subjects in particular, and every other Person who sincerely wishes the Repose, and Happiness, of Christendom, ought not highly to extoll and applaud His M---y's Conduct upon this Occasion; and look upon Him as rais'd up by Heaven to become a Universal Blessing to *Europe*.

I might mention, that another happy Consequence of His M---y's going Abroad, which we look for here, will be, a farther Strengthening of the Protestant Interest, by Disposing of, in Marriage, to Protestant Princes, the Princesses of the Blood Royal of *England*; but having said enough, I think, already, to convince any Man, worth convincing; enough to satisfy, to the Satisfaction of the Publick, as Your Grace was pleas'd to term it, His M---y's Visiting

of his *German* Dominions, when the Nation was engag'd in a War, I shall say no more ; but offer the Whole to Your Grace, as a renew'd Testimony how highly I esteem the Honour of, and how ready an Obedience I would always pay to Your Grace's Commands, as,

My LORD DUKE,

Your GRACE's

Most Obedient,

Most Humble Servant,

Westminster,
June 2. 1740.

J. G.





T H E

D--ke of A--le's SPEECH

April 15. 1740.

Upon the STATE of the NATION.

MY LORDS,



THE Present Question is of so great Importance, that I cou'd wish that every Lord in this House was to declare his Opinion, with the same Sincerity, with the same Unreservedness which I think is my indispensable Duty to use, when I lay my poor Thoughts before your Lordships. I, my Lords, have no View in speaking upon public Affairs, but to do that Service to my Master and my Country, that I think every Lord in this House ought to aim at, without regarding who takes his honest Endeavours amiss; for, my own Part, my Lords, I have ever since I had the Honour to sit in this House, spoke my Mind with equal Freedom upon all Occasions, and will continue to do it the more sincerely as I have neither Hopes nor Fears from this Administration, and as few from the next; and, my Lords, so void is my Breast of all partial Considerations, of all interested Views,

Views, that I don't care, if all my Thoughts were read at *Charing-Cross*, all my Ambition being to be thought a Man who speaks and acts as he thinks, and, my Lords, it has been long my Opinion that by such a Conduct, a Man may even force the Esteem of his Enemies.

I, my Lords, have liv'd long enough in the World, to be able to compare the once flourishing State of this Country, with its present melancholy Situation: I have seen, my Lords, a Time when *Great Britain* was glorious, triumphant and terrible Abroad, her Government lov'd, respected and envy'd at Home; when her Enmity was dreaded, and when her Alliance was courted. Is there a Subject in this Kingdom, my Lords, who can reflect that these were once the happy Circumstances of this Country, and yet sees the deplorable Alteration which a few Years has made, who will not feel a sensible Concern upon the Comparison, however Self-Interest may alleviate his Grief. I know, my Lords, what has been said in Favour of those who have been the Instruments of bringing this melancholy Change about; I know it has been attributed to Fortune, and to unforeseen Causes. My Lords, I am very sensible that Fortune has very often a very great Hand in Public Events, and that a Nation may suffer a great deal from Events, that no Human Foresight cou'd prevent or guard against; but I am far from thinking that this has been our Case. I am apt to believe, my Lords, that Fortune has been favourable to us, and presented us with many Opportunities of raising the Honour and Interest of this Nation, to as high a Pitch as ever, even while they have been suffering the most, but that these Opportunities have been all wantonly slighted, and neglected. It is, my Lords, I am afraid, owing to a long Series of Misconduct, to a long Train of weak Measures, unsuccessful and unnatural Expedients, and not to Fortune, that this Nation has suffer'd so much in her

her Character and Interest in all the Courts of *Europe*. A very slight Review, my Lords, of our Conduct for some Years past may convince any Man of this Truth.

The Treaty of *Utrecht*, my Lords, is a Measure that we have been often told is the Source of all those Inconsistencies that appear in our Conduct for these last five and twenty Years. My Lords, I had the Honour of sitting in this House at that Time, and to have some Share in the Successes that might have entitled us to a much better Treaty; I am very sensible it was not a good Treaty, and when it came to be consider'd by the House, no Lord spoke with greater Freedom on that Occasion than I did. At the same Time, my Lords, my Opposition to that Treaty cou'd not proceed from any Dissatisfaction, from any ill Will that I cou'd bear to those who concluded it. I liv'd on good Terms, nay had personal Friendships with several who had a large Share in the Negotiations that brought it about; but I oppos'd it because I thought it might have been better, and because it gave up many Advantages that we might have then justly claim'd. But, my Lords, bad as it was, I don't think you have made a better since, and had even the Advantages which the Nation gain'd by the Treaty of *Utrecht*, been improv'd by the next Ministry, had they made a right Use of their Power in cementing the short liv'd Misunderstandings, that soon after broke out among our Allies, and thus depriving *France* of all the Means of retrieving her Power upon these Differences, you might, notwithstanding all that then happen'd, have gone on from Glory to Glory till you had fix'd the Ballance of Power unalterably in your own Hands.

But, my Lords, the succeeding Ministry took no Warning from the Misconduct of their Predecessors; they took no Care to avoid treading in their Footsteps, tho' the Ruin, to which they led was so clearly
and

and so evidently pointed out ; they fell into a train of foolish Negotiations which disoblig'd and detach'd your best Friends from your Interests, and which gave your natural Enemies an Opportunity of retrieving all they had lost. They adopted a Maxim, my Lords, that any, even the most dishonourable Peace, was preferable to a War, and by their inviolable Adherence to this Maxim, they have led you into all that Discredit, I had almost said Scandal, that has come upon you from all Quarters. This Situation, my Lords, is the more dreadful as it is attended with no Security. We have Negotiated Ourselves out of all Reputation, and tho' we have been doing nothing, but forming Alliances and making Treaties for these twenty Years past, we have not at this Day one Ally in the World, nor one Treaty that at this Time stands us in any stead. My Lords, I appeal to Facts : Where are your Allies ? Have you receiv'd the least Assistance from any Power in *Europe* since you enter'd into this War ; or, is there any Appearance of their declaring in your Favour ?

Having said thus much, my Lords, upon the General State of the Nation at this time, I shall now trouble your Lordships with my Opinion as to this particular Question. And here, my Lords, I cannot help declaring, that I think the Words of the Question are extremely proper, and that it is very becoming your Lordships Wisdom and Dignity, while you have the State of the Nation under your Consideration, to enquire into the Particulars which this Resolution comprehends. It consists, my Lords, of two plain undeniable Facts, and one Consequence ; therefore I cannot see the least Grounds for supposing with a noble Lord, who has spoken in this Debate, that our agreeing to this Resolution can ever reflect the least Dishonour upon the glorious Success at *Porto-Bello*, or that it is a Censure upon the Congratulations which have been presented already to his Majesty on
that

that account. My Lords, Truth will be Truth, whatever Glosses are made to disguise it, and whatever Attempts are made to prevert it. The present Question contains nothing but what every Lord must admit of. The Parts of which it consists, are no way complicated, and must be understood by every body who takes the pains to consider the Fact; which, my Lords, is that if Admiral *Vernon* had been furnish'd with a proper Body of Land-Forces, ' the taking of ' *Porto-Bello* might have been render'd not only more ' certain and infallible, but have been attended with ' greater Consequences to the Nation. ' My Lords, the noble Lord who made the Motion, gave your Lordships no ground for thinking that he meant a Scriptural infallibility as the Church of *Rome* vests in her Popes, by the Words *certain* and *infallible* contain'd in this Motion; no, my Lords, as I understand the Words of the Resolution, they mean no more than that if Admiral *Vernon* had been furnished with Land-Forces, it was fifty thousand to one if he had fail'd in his Attack upon *Porto Bello*; whereas, there were many Chances to one against his Success, as he was not furnish'd with them. The Words *certain* and *infallible* therefore, are here put in opposition to the Precariousness and Uncertainty he was under in making such an Attack with so trifling a Number. For, my Lords, give me leave to say it, had the *Spaniards* behaved with Resolution, had they defended the Place as well as its Fortifications might have admitted of, Admiral *Vernon* could not have succeeded. And as it was, my Lords, nothing but his own Intrepidity and good Conduct cou'd have prevented his Ships coming very indifferently off, but he acted with the Resolution that became an *English* Admiral, he said he *cou'd take the Place, and he would take it*; and, my Lords, it was owing to him, and him only, that it was taken: For it appears that his Ship did all the

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Damage

Damage to the *Spaniards*. Now, my Lords, can any Lord doubt, that if Admiral *Vernon* had been properly supported by a sufficient Body of Land-Forces, that he might not have attempted greater Matters than the taking and demolishing of *Porto-Bello*?

Having said thus much, my Lords, in Defence of the Facts contain'd in the Question, I come now to the Consequence which I suppose to have been that Part of the Motion that has given Rise to all this Debate. This Consequence, my Lords, is that the not sending Land-Forces with Mr. *Vernon*, was a Piece of Mismanagement in the prosecuting *this just and necessary War*. My Lords, who doubts that it was? A noble Lord who spoke first in the Debate, was pleas'd to say, that in a great many Things were necessary to be provided, in order to embark any Number of Land-Forces for so distant a Voyage. My Lords, it is now a long time since I serv'd, and it is possible that at my Years I may have forgot a good deal; but, my Lords, I hope, that what I have forgot is amply supply'd by the Experience and Capacity of my Cotemporaries and Fellow-Officers, and that they, (several of them, my Lords, sit in this House) will set me right if I should mistake in any Point. My Lords, I have been a little us'd to Embarkations, and I do agree with the Lord, that the Embarkation of Troops is a very tedious and difficult Matter. But your Lordships will be pleas'd to observe one Distinction which the noble Lord did not make; and that is, my Lords, that there is a great Difference betwixt embarking Horse and Foot. I have had Experience of both, and it certainly is no easy Matter to embark any Number of Horse; but, my Lords, it is by no means so difficult a Matter to embark five or six, or eight thousand Foot. And had such a Number been embark'd at the Time when the Troops were brought over from *Ireland*, my Lords, I make no doubt but by
this

this Time we might have been in the Possession of a Place in the *West-Indies*, which might have paid us for all the Expence of this War, had we kept it. The taking of *Porto-Bello*, my Lords, was a brave Action, it shew'd what an *English* Squadron, if rightly commanded, can do; but had Mr. *Vernon* been at that Time furnished with a proper Body of Land Forces, I don't know how far he might have carried his Conquests. Common Fame reports, that he is now before *Carthagena*, and I wish him all the Success which his Bravery and Conduct deserve; but does any Lord here doubt, that if at this Time, supposing him to be before *Carthagena*, he had eight or ten Battalions along with him, that he might not promise himself a much more certain and easy Conquest. Had he eight or ten Battalions on board, my Lords, might he not attempt a Conquest of more Importance to this Nation than even that of *Carthagena* itself. My Lords, I speak of these Things according to the Light in which they appear to me; what private Reasons there might be for not sending Land-Forces along with that Admiral, I shall not pretend to account for; because I am no otherwise acquainted with the publick Transactions than all the good People in *England* either are or may be.

A noble Duke who has spoke in this Debate has said, that the Season of the Year is to be considered, and that the sending Troops to *America* at certain Seasons is attended with the worst Consequences to the Persons of the Men. My Lords, I am extremely sensible of that, and know, that if you send Men from this Kingdom at such a Season as that they must land in *America* during the unwholesome Months, you send them to their Death. For which Reason, my Lords, when I heard a great deal of Talk about an Expedition, and that we were to send over ten or twelve thousand Men to *America*, in order to take the *Havannah* or some important Place from the *Spaniards*,

niards, I thought it was a very right Measure ; but when I heard that the Troops design'd for that Expedition, were to be sent off from *Britain* about the End of *February* or the Beginning of *March*, I said that it was impossible, and that they must land in *America* at the very Time when the violent Heats and Unwholesomeness of the Climate must kill, at least, one half of them. Therefore, my Lords, I was very glad to hear that this Expedition was delay'd to a more proper Opportunity. But, my Lords, when Admiral *Vernon* sail'd from this, it was the properest Season in all the Year for sending Men over to *America* ; for they must have landed there at the best Time and in the mildest Season of all the Year ; so that no Objection of that Kind can be brought against our not sending Land-Forces with Mr. *Vernon*. As we did not think proper to send them at that Time, my Lords, we lost that Year, and if we shall let the approaching Season pass without sending out the Troops design'd for the Expedition so much talk'd of, we must lose another Year, and so give the *Spaniards* more Time for fortifying and putting themselves upon their Guard. So that, my Lords, I take it this is a plain Argument why we out to agree to this Resolution ; for if we knew at the Time of Mr. *Vernon*'s sailing from this, that we must lose another Year, in case we did not send the Land-Forces then, to be sure, they who were in the Direction of Affairs were the more inexcusable, as they brought another Year's Expences upon the Back of the Nation, which is so little able to bear it. For, my Lords, it is there that that we can most effectually distress them, it is there that their most sensible Parts lie, and it is only by attacking them there, that we can ever hope to get out of this War with Honour and Advantage.

The same Noble Duke was pleas'd to assert, that all had been done that could be expected on the Coast of Old *Spain*, where we have had a strong Squadron lying

lying for near two Years past. All has been done, my Lords! What single Thing has been done, (except the taking a Ship or two) that could make the *Spaniards* feel that you had a Squadron there: And, my Lords, give me Leave to say, a Squadron fitted out at a vast Expence to this Nation; it consisted of more and better Ships than even Sir *John Jennings's*, who will always be remember'd on those Seas to his immortal Honour, ever had the Command of. It was a stronger Fleet, my Lords, than ever was given to Sir *John Norris*, who certainly, in his Way, as a Sea-Officer, is superior to any Man in *Europe*. My Lords, I think the Service upon which Mr. *Haddock* was sent deserv'd to have been committed to one of your Admirals, the best and ablest Officer in his Majesty's Service; I say this, my Lords, without any Intention to reflect upon any Gentleman who has the Honour to serve his Majesty as a Sea-Officer, I have a great Esteem for all, and no Exceptions to any of them: But, my Lords, as our Reputation was above all Things to be regarded, especially at the Beginning of this War, I think we ought to have employ'd those who had Rank and Standing in the Fleet, besides Courage, which every Man is suppos'd to have; and this would have, perhaps, given the *Spaniards* to understand that we were in Earnest, as much as any Thing, except some vigorous Stroke.

But, my Lords, give me Leave to ask what has this great Fleet done? What Return has the Nation had for all the immense Expences she has been at in fitting it out? Has it done any Thing to retrieve your Honour, any Thing to revenge your Wrongs, any thing that may answer the great and necessary Purpose for which this War was enter'd into? No; the Trade of the Nation has suffer'd vastly in those very Seas where this Fleet lay. The *Spaniards* have indeed been prevented from sending out their Ships; but at the same Time they have got a great many safely home, notwithstanding

withstanding the Vigilance of this Fleet of ours. Then has nothing been done, my Lords, and will any Man say that nothing was to be done? Unexperient'd as I am, in naval Affairs, I could point out several things that might have been done, besides blocking their Ships up in the Bay of *Cales*.

And here, my Lords, I must beg your Lordships Indulgence a little if I give the House my Sentiments, with Regard to that favourite Piece of Service, I mean the blocking up the *Spanish* Fleet in the Bay of *Cales*. I know I am singular in my Opinion on that Head, and I don't expect that many Lords will be of my Way of Thinking in this Particular; but, my Lords, I think it was a very useless, ill-judg'd Piece of Service. It was a Piece of Service that this Nation had much better been without. I am sorry, my Lords, that I differ with those who gave the Orders in this Respect; but I think it had been much better that the *Spanish* Fleet had sail'd. For, my Lords, if it had sail'd, we could have follow'd them to *America*, perhaps overtaken them at open Sea; in any Event we must have met with them in the *West-Indies*; and then, my Lords, we could have destroy'd or taken them, which would have been a brave and a seasonable Piece of Service to the Nation. Nay, my Lords, if we had had a proper Land-force on board, we could at the same Time have made other Pushes, which could not have fail'd of being of vast Advantage to this Nation; and putting the Differences betwixt us and *Spain* upon a very short Issue.

But, my Lords, to what purpose has this Fleet been blocking up the *Spanish* Ships all this time in their Harbour? If I am rightly inform'd, or if I am to give any Credit to what is very publickly talk'd, that Service has been ineffectual; for the *Spanish* Ships have escaped. So that, my Lords, we have for two Years; at a vast Expende, been endeavouring to do what we find turns out to no manner of Account, while,

while there were many Services which that Fleet might have perform'd, that must have put an End to the War in our Favour before this Time. I know, my Lords, it is given out that *Portmahon* was in Danger, and that our Admiral has sail'd to prevent any Surprise from that Quarter; but when I reflect upon the long Time he has now been at Sea, and the Nature of the Seas where he has been lying, I doubt his Ships have been so dreadfully out of Order, that he has been oblig'd to leave his Station. From what I have said, your Lordships may see that it is evident, the War on that Quarter has been very ill manag'd, and Fortune is not to blame; for we have met with no cross Accidents, no Losses that have disabled us from performing Services that might have been solid and lasting Advantages to the Nation, besides saving the vast Sums that we have been oblig'd to expend. I shall not, my Lords, pretend to point out by whose Fault has it happen'd. I know Admiral *Haddock* to be a very brave worthy Man, and one who I am sure would, as far as the Force he had with him could reach, perform any Piece of Service for the Honour of his King and Country, that he was sent out on: In short, my Lords, I know him to be a Man who as a Sea-Officer has every good Quality, except that of great Experience in great Command. For all these Reasons, my Lords, when I reflect upon the unactive State he has been in ever since he has sail'd from *England*; when at the same Time I reflect upon the great Services which it was in his Power to have perform'd, I cannot in Charity but doubt that his Instructions bound up his Hands. There is not, my Lords, a common Sailor that wont tell you, if you ask him, that fifty Things might have been done to annoy the *Spaniards* upon those very Seas.

Having said thus much with Regard to Admiral *Haddock*, and what has been done in the *Mediterranean*, I shall now take the Liberty to make some Observations

vations upon what a Noble Duke has said in Excuse for our not sending a sufficient Number of Troops to the *West-Indies*. His Grace took Notice, that when Mr. *Vernon* sail'd, the Battalions from *Ireland* had been arriv'd but two Days, and therefore that they were in a very bad Condition to be shipp'd on Board for such a Voyage. It is very true, my Lords, that it must have been impracticable to have sent those Troops on Board at that Time. But what I would be inform'd of, is, Why those Troops from *Ireland* were not sooner brought over? Can it be pretended, that it was uncertain we should enter into a War with *Spain* before that Time? My Lords, I appeal to the Papers upon your Lordships Table to prove, that, even in the Opinion of our M---y, the War was then inevitable. I appeal to what pass'd in this very House, when several Lords, who certainly knew a great deal of what was passing at that Time, declar'd that all speaking and treating was now at an End, and that then was the Time for acting. But, my Lords, where could the Harm have been, if, upon even the Suspicion that the Nation was to enter into a War, these Troops had been brought from *Ireland*? My Lords, the very Letters which *Geraldino* wrote up and down this Kingdom before he went away, don't leave us the least Room to question, but that the Ministry, long before that Time, knew that a Rupture with *Spain* was unavoidable.

My Lords, I come now to speak a little with Regard to the Management of our Affairs at Land, the Element to which my Services have been mostly confin'd. And here, my Lords, give me Leave to say, that I must give up all Pretensions to common Sense, if there have not been many wrong Steps taken in the Affairs of the Army, so far as it appears to me, since our entering into this War. I am glad of this Opportunity of disclaiming my having any Hand in such a Conduct, as I every Day observe; if they who

Who give the Orders shall reap any Honour from their Management, I shall rob them of no share of it, and I wish them much Joy in it ; but at the same Time, while that I renounce the Honour, I refuse to have any Part of the Discredit that may arise from the present Measures that are pursued. The noble D---ke who spoke in the Debate said, that he should have look'd upon himself as a Traitor to his Prince, if he had advised him to any other Measures than what have been pursued. My Lords, there the noble D---ke and I widely differ ; had I had the Honour to have advised his Majesty, I should have been clearly of Opinion, that a Body of 6 or 8000 Men had been sent out with Mr. *Vernon*, and those too of the very best Troops we have. It was owing to Mr. *Vernon's* Courage, my Lords, that he succeeded as he did, and he has been nobly rewarded. He has, my Lords, had the very same Reward that was bestow'd upon the late Duke of *Marlborough* upon the Victories of *Hochsted*, *Ramelies* and *Malplaquet* ; and that is the Addressees of both Houses of Parliament, and of the City of *London*, congratulating his Majesty upon his Success. So that there cannot, my Lords, be greater Honours done to a Subject, than what has on this Occasion been done to that brave honest Man Mr. *Vernon* ; that is the greatest Character that I can give any Man ; and that Character I know he deserves. But, my Lords, no Officer in the King's Service has for some Years past made so little a Figure in his Way as this gallant Admiral has done. I cannot say what this is owing to, but his present Glory makes him ample amends for all his late Obscurity. And, my Lords, give me leave here to observe, what a vast Encouragement it is for all his Majesty's Officers to do their Duty, when they reflect that their Success procures them the greatest Rewards and Honours.

* * * * *

My Lords, I am far from believing the Gentlemen of the Navy when they tell us, that their Ships are a sufficient Guard to our Coasts, and that we can by means of them prevent all Invasions. I do admit, my Lords, that the *French* may take an Opportunity to throw over 10 or 12000 Men here, and that our Ships can't prevent their Landing; but, my Lords, tho' we had sent out 10 Battalions with Mr. *Vernon*, we still had 18000 Men left to guard the Nation, and these must have been an Over-match for any Number of Men the *French* cou'd have landed here. All the Number, my Lords, which they can throw over to this Country before our Fleet come to our Assistance are so inconsiderable, that their Landing would deserve the Name of a *Surprize* rather than of an *Invasion*.

Let us suppose the worst, my Lords, and that we had been invaded with a greater Number, our 18000 Men must still have made Head against them, and I dare say, it could have been no difficult thing for the Government to have rais'd Recruits, as many as they cou'd have Occasion for.

But, my Lords, I cannot for my Life conceive what should tempt *France* to invade you; she has at the Head of her Councils a Minister who knows how to make Peace and how to make War, and both equally to the Honour of his Country. If that Minister, my Lords, entertains any Designs to the Prejudice of this Nation, he will never invade us while he has us in the very Situation he cou'd wish for. We are now paying great Fleets, great Armies, my Lords, we have been paying them for some Years past, and all to no purpose. This plays the Game of *France*, if she has a Design to break with you, more effectually than any Invasion can do, while the Nation reaps no Advantage from the vast Expence she is at. My Lords, I am afraid we are now suffering more than if she were actually at War with us; we from Year to Year, keep up useless Armaments by Sea and Land,
which

which must ruin our Finances; and Finances, my Lords, are the Blood and Sinews of War.

The noble D--ke took notice, that our agreeing to this Resolution look'd like passing a Censure upon what we had already congratulated his Majesty for. No, my Lords, I see no Reason for viewing it in that Light. It is very possible that this House may approve of one Step and disapprove of the rest, and I believe there are many Precedents of it. The noble D--ke likewise said, that the infamous Libels which are daily published against the Government, are a proper Consideration for this House, when we are upon the State of the Nation. My Lords, I have occasion to see a good many Papers wrote upon publick Affairs upon both Sides of the Question. My Opinion of them, my Lords, is, that on one Side they are weak, scurrilous, void of Reasoning, and never can be accus'd of Wit. On the other side, they are wrote with at least a Shew of Reasoning and Argument, and with Regard to good Sense and good Manners. And, my Lords, it is notorious, that in the Papers of the former, some of the greatest Characters in the Nation have been attack'd and blacken'd; so that an Enquiry of that kind, wou'd, I believe, come out no way in favour of those who write for the A-----n.

Upon the whole, my Lords, I don't see the least Inconveniency that can attend your Lordships agreeing to the Resolution: To me it contains nothing but a plain demonstrable Fact; and all the Arguments I have heard against it have rather confin'd me in favour of it. I see no Reason why your Lordships should be in any pain about agreeing to a thing that can affect but a very few, and may occasion the future Management of this War to be put upon a more sure and advantageous Footing for this Nation than it has hitherto been. I am persuaded, my Lords, that if the thing that is censured in this Resolution had been properly

perly provided against, we should have by this Time brought our Enemies very low, and have either oblig'd those who are neuter to be our very good Friends, or to declare themselves in such a Manner as might put us upon our Guard, and let us know what we are to expect. My Lords, I ask your Lordships Pardon for having thus troubled you thus long, but I thought the Importance of the Occasion required it. I shall conclude with declaring, **THAT I AM FOR AGREEING TO THE MOTION.**

I shall here state the Proposal, which occasion'd the foregoing Speech; and then give you the Reply to what his Grace had advanc'd in Favour of the Question.

IT was propos'd to resolve, That the unexpected Taking and Demolishing of *Porto Bello* by Admiral *Vernon*, with no other Land-Forces than 240 Men lent him by the Governour of *Jamaica*, might *not only have been render'd certain and infallible, but likewise*, have been attended with further and greater Success, if some of our Land-Forces, commanded by Experienced Officers had been sent to the *West-Indies*, about the same Time that Admiral sail'd, and that the sending of no Land-Forces hitherto into *America* is a manifest Piece of ill Conduct, in the Prosecution of this just and necessary War.

And a Question being stated thereupon, after a Debate.

It was order'd to leave out the Words, *not only have been render'd certain and infallible, but likewise.*

And the Question being put upon the said Proposition, without these Words.

It was resolved in the Negative.

T H E



T H E
D--ke of *A---le's* S P E E C H

Answered by a

***** *****, in the ***** of *****'s.

MY LORDS,



O W unequal soever I may be to reply to so labour'd and thoroughly considered a Speech as that seems to have been, which your Lordships have been entertain'd with, by the Noble Duke who spoke last; yet I hope the Uprightness of my Intentions, towards my King and Country, may plead for your Lordships Indulgence, if my Zeal to contribute my Mite to the Service of these, get the better of a thorough Consciousness of my own Weakness and Inability.

I must confess, my Lords, it was no little Surprise to me to hear a Noble Duke so earnest in pressing those of your Lordships, who spoke in this Debate, to declare their Opinion with the same Sincerity which
he

he thought it his indispensable Duty to use; when the only Reason his Grace is pleas'd to furnish us with, for his own Sincerity is, because his Grace *has neither Hopes nor Fears from this Administration; and as few from the next*: Tho', I hope, had his Grace both, 'twould be without Impeachment of his Integrity, and with this Measure that I mete, I hope it will be measured to me again.

I shall not take up your Lordship's Time by Attempts at unnecessary Flourishes, foreign to the Debate: I am for no Panegyricks upon Living Ministers; they don't stand in Need of them; neither shall I offer any unnecessary Insults to the Memory of Dead Ministers; they have had their Deserts; and the kindest Way we can behave to them, is to forget them.

I am, my Lords, I believe I may venture to affirm it, of much the same Age, as the Noble Duke is of, who spoke last; and 'tis well known, I have from my Youth been always conversant in Publick Affairs; the Constitution of my Country has been my Study, and I have ever made the strictest Observations (I have been capable of) on the State of the Nation, since my first entering into the Service of it: I have seen this Noble Duke himself in very different Stations; sometimes in, sometimes out; pleas'd, and displeas'd; sometimes in more Employments, and together, of much more Value, than any one Subject, besides himself, possess'd in the Kingdom; sometimes divested of them all, and reduc'd to private Circumstances; but I never form'd then, or could see any Reason to form, my Notions of the State of the Nation, from the Changes in the Fortunes of a single Nobleman, how deserving soever he might be; and I must beg leave, my Lords, to declare, that I so widely, so very widely differ in Sentiments, from the Noble Duke who spoke last, (when he is pleas'd to represent us in a melancholy Situation,) that from the best Judgment

I have been able to form, there is not any Period his Grace is able to pitch upon, since he or I was born, that deserv'd the Name of Flourishing; if that Name is denied to the Present.

Some Things have been offer'd, which I should think myself inexcusable to take up your Lordship's Time in attempting to refute, or even to repeat; I look upon them to be so foreign to the Business of the Day, that had they wanted the Weight and Sanction, if I may be allow'd to call it such, of him, who introduc'd them to Your Lordships they would, I make no Question, have been thought mere Harangues and unnecessary.

Excuse me, my Lords, if I think some Hints have been thrown out, which might tempt us, even to call in Question, that Breast's being *void of all partial Considerations, of all interested Views*, from whence they came; and that the Noble Duke who has, in my Apprehension, thrown them out, instead of *not caring, if all his THOUGHTS were read at Charing Cross*, (which is the first Time, I confess, my Lords, that, in this House, I ever heard of *Thoughts* being read) calculated what he has SAID to be sold there.

Indulge me once more, my Lords, with troubling your Lordships with a farther Cause of my Surprise: By his Grace's Account, there has been little or no Alteration, a Sort of Sameness, in Publick Measures, for Twenty Years past; and we all know, my Lords, that there has been the same Person at the Head of those Measures; who has always been suppos'd to have the greatest Influence upon those Measures; who has been chief in concerting them; and principally concern'd in their Execution, almost the whole Time; how then is it possible to reconcile the Insinuations which have been made to your Lordships this Day, with the well known, and often repeated Apothegm of a Noble Duke, that all First Ministers must

must have Faults, but, *By G-d, Sir* *****
 had the *fewest Faults* of any Minister he had to do
 with in his Life.

But if we were to make his Grace's Caprice the
 Rule of our Judgment ; the Worth of the Minister
 would suffer but little Diminution ; unless we allow-
 ed, the most consummate Statesman, and greatest
 Captain of the Age he liv'd in, or which any Age e-
 ver produc'd, the immortal Duke of *Marlborough*,
 (who was so unhappy as to fall under his Grace's Dis-
 approbation) to come in for his Share ; and be sunk in
 our Esteem, the same Way.

'Tis owing to the unhappy Contexture of some
 Compositions, that they have a never-to-be-satisfied
 Thirst of Soul after Money, Places, and Power ; so
 that the wisest and best of Men, the most valuable
 and worthy of Ministers, can never keep well with
 them, any longer, than they are gorging their rave-
 nous Appetites ; such Men are never easy long ; they
 are always craving ; the more that's granted, the
 more they expect.

It cannot, I persuade myself, but be a little allarm-
 ing in general, I confess, 'tis very much so to myself,
 in particular ; as I am well assur'd, 'tis to many more
 in this House ; to hear his Grace softening one of the
 most fatal infamous Transactions that ever Ministers
 were engag'd in, with ----- I am sensible, that the
 Treaty of *Utrecht* was not a good Treaty.

'Twas that Treaty which robb'd us of the Fruits of
 a War, attended with the most glorious Success ; It
 was that Treaty which has been the Source of infinite
 Mischiefs to this Nation since ; which has for many
 Years embarrass'd Publick Affairs ; thrown Weights
 upon the present Administration, which former Ad-
 ministrations were Strangers to, and loaded us with
 a Debt, which must be the Work of Ages to dis-
 charge.

But

. But the Noble Duke is pleas'd to advance much farther in Favour of the Treaty of *Utrecht* than this ; and it either has a much larger Share in his good Graces, than ever I could have imagin'd it would have had, or else all Treaties subsequent to it have lost his Grace's Esteem ; and, *he has no Occasion for any of their Services*, for the Noble Duke is so good to tell us ; his Grace don't put himself to the Trouble of proving it ; that *he don't think*, that we have made a better Treaty since.

I profess, my Lords, to pay great Deference to his Grace's Discernment, and to have a high Opinion of his Judgment ; and yet, for my Soul, I cannot but think his Grace's particular Attachments, and Prejudices, get the better of his Understanding here : I am so far from being in the same Way of thinking upon this Head, that I firmly believe so bad a Treaty never was made ; as that of *Utrecht* ; or that a worse ever can be made : And thus far give me leave to add, my Lords, as to those consequent to that of *Utrecht* ; (we may blame what Men and Measures, we think proper ; as nothing is more easy than to find Fault ; and Thanks to those Principles of Liberty, *as they are called*, which our Forefathers were Strangers to, nothing in the present Day is more common than Injustice and Calumny,) that there has neither been a Peace, Treaty, or Convention, *call it, my Lords, what you please*, enter'd into by *Great Britain*, since the first of *August 1714*, but what was so much better than the Treaty of *Utrecht*, that any one of them had been greatly more our Advantage, considering we are a Trading Nation, than 'tis possible for the most successful War, ever to prove ; had not Perfidiousness and Breach of National Faith in our Enemies been the sole Obstacle to their being carried into Execution.

My Lords, it has been affirm'd, that we have not at this Day, one Ally ; or at this Time, one Treaty, which stands us in any Stead ; the contrary to which

is too notorious for me to take up a Moment of your Lordships Time about; I would only observe, my Lords, that we want no Allies or Assistance in our present Dispute with the *Spaniards*; we are sufficiently able to deal with them; and do ourselves Justice for all the Injustice we have met at their Hands.

I don't doubt, if they are not so already, but that they will very soon be fully sensible of this to their Cost; and therefore what valuable Ends could be answer'd by the mentioning of Circumstances so remote to the Affair immediately before us, and with such slender Foundations in Fact, to support them, is what I cannot take upon myself readily to account for.

Assertions, without Proofs, my Lords, we have too long been us'd to without Doors; God forbid such Treatment of Mankind should ever make its Way into this House, to the Detriment of the meanest Man alive; much less to the Injury of some of the greatest Men in the Kingdom; whose Services and Importance, at least, claim from us, evident Proofs of Misconduct, before we censure for it; to act otherwise would be more like Pamphleteers, than P-rs, who, in this Day of unparallel'd Licentiousness, stuff their Harangues with groundless Suggestions to catch the Ears of the Mob, as the best Way to pick their Pockets, which is all they aim at.

I have enlarg'd upon this particularly, but no more, as I take it, than what the Noble Duke who spoke last necessitated me to: I shall now trouble your Lordship, with my Opinion as to this particular Question; and here I cannot but agree with his Grace, that it is very becoming your Lordship's Wisdom and Dignity, while you have the State of the Nation under your Consideration, to enquire into the Particulars which this Resolution comprehends.

Thus far I can go with his Grace, but no farther; for I profess I am perfectly of Opinion with a Noble Lord,

Lord, who has spoken in this Debate, that our Agreeing to this Resolution will reflect Dishonour upon the glorious Success, of Admiral *Vernon*, at *Porto Bello*; and will be a Censure upon the Congratulations which have been presented already to His Majesty on that Account.

The proposed Resolution has it, “ that the Taking of *Porto Bello* might have been render’d, not only more certain and INFALLIBLE, but have been attended with greater Consequences to the Nation,----if Admiral *Vernon* had been furnished with a proper Body of Land Forces on Board.

That Admiral *Vernon* was properly furnish’d for this Expedition, I am satisfied every Lord in this House will believe, when he is assur’d that he was furnish’d to the Full, and even beyond of what he required: Six Men of War were all that he asked; he was perswaded he could carry the Place with these; and was determin’d to make Use of no more; and the Event has shewn he was right in his Judgment: He had a Seventh in his Squadron, but would not allow the supernumerary One to have any Share in the Action, and therefore sent her upon a Cruise off *Cartagena*: Neither Admiral *Vernon*’s Courage, Judgment, or Conduct were ever question’d, which, to my Knowledge, is more than can be said of every Gentleman, who, in our Day, has been entrusted with a CHIEF COMMAND.

I own, my Lords, I am at a Loss to comprehend what we have to do with INFALLIBLE here; notwithstanding all the Pains his Grace has taken to explain it to us; ’tis a strange Sort of Climax we are puzzl’d with; *more certain*, implies some Sort of Certainty before; then comes *infallible*, which is, I suppose, something more certain, than Certainty itself;--These, I suppose, are thrown together to give us, an *inimitable Sample*, as I believe I may be allow’d to

call it, of their *exquisite Ability*, who drew up this refined Resolution.

My Lords, I own 'tis beyond my Comprehension, how we can save the Honour of Admiral *Vernon*, and yet come into the Resolution; He wanted but six Ships, and six he had; he was resolv'd to have no more with him; a small Body of Troops he knew would be sufficient for his Purpose: These he was sure of at *Jamaica*; and, very prudently too, chose rather to take them on Board there, than carry, so long a Voyage as from hence, Men unus'd to the Sea, and not season'd to the Climate: If it was owing to him, and him only, as his Grace has been pleas'd to affirm, that *Porto Bello* was taken; and that 'twas his Ship that did all the Damage to the *Spaniards*; then certainly Mr. *Vernon* was perfectly right in his Judgment; he had a sufficient Force to effect, what he had undertaken; to have added to it would have been an unnecessary Expence to the Nation; and which 'tis not unlikely we might have heard complain'd of in this House; 'twould have been calling his Judgment in Question; 'twould have argu'd great Diffidence in both his Conduct and Bravery; and I cannot, but be of Opinion, my Lords, that if we should be prevail'd with to pass this Resolution, it must be look'd upon, by the whole Kingdom, as a Reflection upon this gallant Man; as a Censuring of him, for Rashness; Want of Knowledge; or, at best, for having acted in a Manner, which not any Thing but the happy Success, which has attended him, could have justified him in.

The Noble Duke is pleas'd to ask, Whether any Lord can doubt, that if the Admiral had been properly supported by a sufficient Body of Land-Forces, that he might not have attempted greater Matters than the Taking and Demolishing *Porto Bello*: Undoubtedly he might; I am persuaded, not any Lord in this House questions, but that Mr. *Vernon* is equal to the

the most arduous Undertaking he could be employ'd in; but, in my Opinion, my Lords, this is very foreign to the Purpose: He was properly and sufficiently enough, *as the Event has demonstrated*, supported for the Work he was sent about: Mr. *Vernon* was to strike the first Stroke; and an effectual Stroke he has struck; a glorious and an advantageous One, for both Himself and his Country: The War was now to begin; Mr. *Vernon* was to open the Scene; and give the Enemy an Earnest of what they were to expect in the Prosecution of this War: He was as properly provided, as he need to have been, for his doing this; and *God be thank'd*, he has given them such an Earnest, of what they are to expect, as must open their Eyes; and soon bring them to equitable Terms with us, unless their present Stupidity is equal to their past Injustice and Brutality.

The Noble Duke, who spoke last, when upon the State of the Nation, was for leading us from GLORY to GLORY, *if I don't mistake his Words*, till we had fix'd the Ballance of Power unalterably in our own Hands; *which I don't know was ever out of*, and on the Part we are upon, his Grace seems to push forward, with equal Rapidity: His Grace was for having Eight Thousand Foot of our best Troops, I think his Grace went as far as Eight Thousand, embark'd with Admiral *Vernon*: His Grace, who I flatter myself, is pretty singular upon this Head, was also for our suffering the *Spanish* Fleets to sail for the *West-Indies*; which must have made them ten times stronger, *in the only Part we can attack this Enemy to any Advantage*, than they were before; - - - but then we were to follow them to *America*; perhaps overtake them at open Sea; in any Event we should be sure to come up with them in their *West-Indies*; and as sure to destroy them; then having those Eight Thousand Men on Board, *if I rightly recollect his Grace's Plan of Operation*, we could at the same Time have made other *Pushes*, which could
not

not have fail'd of being of vast Advantage to the Nation ; especially as they would then be in so good a Condition to receive us , and putting the Differences between us and *Spain*, upon a very short Issue.

Nothing is more easy, my Lords, than to talk in this Manner ; but perhaps nothing more hard than to reconcile this specious Plan to Common Sense, when the Improbabilities of its Success, the Obstructions, and unsurmountable Obstacles, to every Part of it, sufficiently known to us all, are consider'd and weigh'd with Candour.

In the mean Time give me leave to tell You, my Lords, of a Story I have heard, of a General Officer, which I think may be very applicable upon this Occasion : He was Commander in Chief of a Body of Troops, sent by his Master, against a Party of Rebels, who had taken up Arms against their Sovereign : *In what Country this happened I dont take upon me to say* : The General's Courage was never question'd, but his Conduct, and his Ability to Command in Chief, suffer'd more, after the Action was over, than his Friends could have wish'd : He came up with the Rebels ; and gave them Battle : They were much Superior to him in Number ; but, being undisciplin'd Troops, were soon broken in upon by the Right Wing of the Army, where the General was in Person ; which drove the Wing of the Enemy's Army, he was engag'd with out of the Field ; the General following the Pursuit two Miles ; without knowing the Fate of his own Men on the Left ; so that it was greatly owing to the Enemy's Want of regular Forces ; and Defect of Military Skill ; or they might have surrounded the King's Army, and cut the Troops all to Pieces ; his Conduct the People of that Country rally'd afterwards by saying that the General was a much better *Christian* than a *Commander in Chief*, for he did not let his Right Hand know, what his Left Hand did : The best Use we can make of this Story, and for which

which I produced it, is, to guard us against deserving the Sarcasm, so just upon the General, by any rash or precipitate Measures in the Course of this War.

I shall trouble your Lordships but with a very little more in Relation to Mr. *Vernon*; I heartily join, as I believe every Lord in this House does, with his Grace in wishing that honest gallant Man the utmost Success in all his Undertakings; but, my Lords, I cannot come into the Opinion, that the not sending Six or Eight Thousand Men with Mr. *Vernon*, was a Piece of Mismanagement in the prosecuting of this War; I rather think it would have been a Piece of Mismanagement to have done it; it must have taken up a great deal of Time to have embark'd them; and provided all the Necessaries, for the Accommodation of so large a Body of Men, in so long a Voyage; the Season for Action might have been far spent before they could have got into the *American* Seas; and if the projected Enterprize upon *Porto Bello*, had not been postpon'd, yet what would he have done with his Land Men afterwards; he could not keep them on Board; he could not have gone upon another Expedition when the hot Season was come on; 'tis not rational to suppose he would have put them in Quarters in so unhealthful a Climate, as that of *Porto Bello*: He then must have been oblig'd to set them on Shore in *Jamaica*; where not being inur'd to the Country, they would have died like rotten Sheep; as they did, even out of those Regiments, which were transported thither, from so hot a Place as *Gibraltar*.

My Lords, I have already taken up a great Deal of your Time; and shall therefore only trouble you with a few Words more, as to our Squadrons in the *Mediterranean*: I am perfectly of the Mind, with a Noble Duke, who has already spoken in this Debate,
that

that all has been done, that was to be expected on the Coast of *Old Spain*; our Settlements there have been protected by them; and our Trade secur'd, as much as it is in the Power of Men of War to secure it! Would we have had them taken Ships, where there were no Ships to take? Or, could they force the King of *Spain* to send a Fleet to Sea, that our Men of War might have the Honour of beating of them: If the *Spaniards* Sloops, and small Craft, kept in shoal Water, out of their Reach, our Men of War may as well be blam'd for not having Wings to fly over Land, as for not being able to come at them; there is not a *Spanish* Town in their Power worth their meddling with; and any Invasion, on the Coasts of *Old Spain*, those Squadrons are capable of, would render us the Jest of *Europe*.

Upon the whole, my Lords; I cannot possibly view, our passin^g this Resolution, in any other Light, than passing a Censure upon what we have already congratulated his Majesty for; reflecting Dishonour upon the glorious Action of *Porto-Bello*; and loading with undeserv'd Odium the Management of this just and necessary War; and therefore I shall conclude with declaring, **THAT I AM NOT FOR AGREEING TO THE MOTION.**



F I N I S

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